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ABSTRACT
In order to provide a timely assessment of India’s fulﬁlment of
international obligations on religious freedom this article explores
the nature and ‘issue-salience’ of diﬀerent human rights
‘pathologies’. It uses critical frame analysis of the corpus of civil
society organisations’ (CSOs) submissions to the third cycle
Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The ﬁndings reveal CSOs’
concerns over the weakening of rule of law institutions and
restrictions on civil society during the period under study. This has
impacted upon the ability of human rights defenders to protect
religious freedom. The civil society discourse also highlights a
broad range of failings; including communal violence, police
malpractice/ judicial shortcomings, discrimination, oppression and
incitement. In contrast, the Government’s UPR submission fails to
acknowledge these issues. In conceptual terms, this disconnect
suggests performativity and legitimation are a feature of the post-
2014 NDA administration’s framing of human rights. It appears to
embrace civil society engagement and the promotion of religious
freedom in a way that advances political legitimacy, whereas civil
society accounts suggest otherwise and point to ‘legitimation’ – or
a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality.
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Introduction
Recent years have seen growing international and domestic concern over ‘the multiple
forms of discrimination that may aﬀect… persons belonging to religious and linguistic
minorities’,1 and ‘violence against members of religious minorities and human rights
defenders’.2 Such concerns are intimately linked to India and the politics of the world’s
largest democracy. As the 2019 elections underline, notwithstanding its status as a
secular state,3 commentators point to the nexus between political context and religious
freedom.4 In particular, they point to the potential dangers of the rise of an alternative
nationalism, based not on secular principles but rather on the premise that Indian
culture is coterminous with Hindu culture.5 For this reason urgent attention to the situ-
ation is now required in the wake of the Hindu nationalist party, Bharatiya Janata
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Party’s (BJP), 2019 election victory. Thus, this study’s principal research aims are: 1. to
identify and explore which human rights issues civil society organisations (CSOs) high-
light in the corpus of third cycle submissions to the United Nations’ Universal Periodic
Review (UPR) 2012–17, 2. To understand the priority (or ‘issue-salience’) they attach to
diﬀerent rights violations. And, 3. Using discourse analysis, to examine the way that
CSOs’ frame their critical views on the Indian government’s response to its international
rights obligations.
The present critical analysis of civil society organisations’ (CSOs’) perspectives on the
human rights situation in India is the latest in a growing body of international work6 –
and is appropriate to human rights scholarship for the following reasons. First, as classical
accounts – such as the work of Alexis De Tocqueville – underline,7 civil society plays a key
role in upholding minority rights and freedoms by acting as a democratic check on ruling
elites. Second, allied to this, in methodological terms the strength of a civil society perspec-
tive lies in standpoint theory8 and CSOs’ ‘situated knowledge’ of rights implementation, as
played out in the lifeworld. Here, building upon earlier studies adopting this approach,9
attention to the language of CSOs provides a useful complement to jurisprudence and quan-
titative indicators. It is a point cogently underlined by Simin Fadaee, who notes that:
the Indian case shows that human rights discourse… has enormous transformative potential
in speciﬁc contexts and situations. It allows diﬀerent meanings, interests and subjectivities to
be attached to notions of human and right. [… it oﬀers] a very powerful medium of social
articulation which provides a base for diverse practical foundations by diverse agents (includ-
ing social movements and civil society organisations).10
Lastly, in the wake of the 2019 BJP election victory, the present critical analysis of the UPR
also provides needed insight into how the situation has changed since the election of the
National Democratic Alliance in May 2014; not least because of increasing concerns over
state suppression of civil society in today’s India. This threat to exogenous criticism of the
government’s human rights record is aptly captured by Subrata Mitra who sagely warns, ‘if
civil society is to remain eﬀective, however, it must resist manipulation by the state and
special interests’.11
In conceptual terms, the wider international signiﬁcance of this focus lies in providing a new
empirical analysis of the challenges of applying universalist norms – upholding religious
freedom as set out in UN rights agreements, whilst respecting religious particularism.
In deﬁnitional terms, a broad literature charts the diﬀerent meanings and interpretations of
the contested notion of freedom of religion.12 For the present purposes it refers to the
tolerance of diﬀerent theological systems of belief, and freedom of individual action to
follow one’s own beliefs. Thus, András Sajó and Renáta Uitz explain, what constitutes the
legal contours of freedom of religion in the international and domestic constitutional contexts:
the formulation of freedom of religion and conscience as an individual right stems partly
from placing religious choices in individual conscience… In a legal sense it is the scope of
protection a legal system is willing to provide to individuals and groups claiming that
their religious liberty has been restricted.13
As explained below, in contrast, the notion of religious particularism14 may be associated
with intolerance and denotes ‘a belief in the exclusive authenticity of one’s own religious
tradition. Religious particularists are likely to believe that salvation is conﬁned to rather
narrowly deﬁned groups of believers’.15 In light of this, an analytical framework linking
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the contours of religious freedom, to the following data analysis was developed (See ‘Meth-
odology’ – below).
The present analysis also has wider signiﬁcance in (1). Underlining the dynamic
relationship between party politics and religious ideology – and how this may aﬀect rule
of law institutions and the ability of individual actors (such as human rights defenders) to
be able to eﬀectively protect religious freedom; and (2). Providing new empirical insights
into contemporary international attempts at securing a participatory approach to rights
implementation via the UPR founded on civil society input and criticality. Viewed in
the context of global religious strife,16 this can be seen as a key challenge for contemporary
rights practice; for as Ishita Banerjee-Dube notes, ‘the contingency and particularity of
religion and politics/power enable their constant redeﬁnition and co-constitution’.17
Accordingly, the remainder of the paper is structured thus: following an outline of the
research context, attention turns to the study methodology. This is followed by a discus-
sion of the study ﬁndings – ﬁrst, in relation to the nature and salience of diﬀerent path-
ologies (Research questions 1. And 2.), and second, CSOs’ use of critical framings
(Research question 3). The implications of the analysis are outlined in the conclusion.
Research context
Recent data conﬁrm the religious diversity of India: Hindus constitute 79.8 per cent
(966,257,353), Muslims 14.23 per cent (172,245,158), Christians 2.3 per cent
(27,819,588), Sikhs 1.72 per cent (20,833,116), Buddhists 0.7 per cent (8,442,972), Jains
0.37 per cent (4,451,753), and other religions including Parsis and Jews constitute 0.6
per cent (7,937,734).18 As Satya Narayan Sabat observes, attempts at securing a framework
of inter-faith tolerance are nothing new,
Indian culture, which is an amalgamation of diﬀerent faiths and religions and boasts of a
written history of about ﬁve thousand years, imbibed and evolved human rights concepts
long ago, long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the European
Renaissance.19
The legal contours of freedom of religion in the international and domestic consti-
tutional contexts have two components. International human rights treaties and the con-
stitution and Penal Code. In the former case, in 1960s and 1970s the country ratiﬁed a
series of UN treaties related to the upholding of religious freedom and human rights
including, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (ICERD), (1968), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), (1979) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) (1979). Notwithstanding these gains, the country has been selective in
its approach to UN treaties. For example, it has adopted reservations to ICERD20 and
has neither ratiﬁed the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR and ICESCR – nor the Conven-
tion against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT). Overall, existing analysis points to India’s mixed compliance record.21
In addition to international obligations, freedom of religion or belief is nominally
enshrined in Articles 15, 25–28 and 325 of the Constitution, adopted by the Indian
Constituent Assembly on November 26, 1949. Thus, for example, Article 15(1) requires
that,
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the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or
condition.22
Such matters fall under the jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court which has considered
arguments over secularism as part of the basic, unamendable features of the Indian Consti-
tution.23 In part, this is supported by Directive Principles and state practice; yet in practice
there is deviation from this principle.24 As Yüksel Sezgin notes, this secular/inclusionary
state model ‘seeks to establish an institutionally and legally uniﬁed personal status system
with jurisdiction over all citizens. However, due to opposition from some religious groups
[… it] is only able to achieve partial uniﬁcation’.25 This is because in relation to the domestic
legal code, the personal laws are inconsistent because diﬀerent religious communities are gov-
erned by diﬀerent laws. Thus, for example, in 1955–56 the state uniﬁed the personal status
laws of Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains, yet Muslims, Parsis, and Christians retained
their own laws.26 As Hanna Lerner observes, in historical context:
instead of formalizing a “critical juncture” in state-religious relations through written consti-
tutional provisions, political actors preferred to transfer decisive choices in the conﬂict over
the religious character of the state to the more ﬂexible arena of ordinary politics by adopting
ambiguous constitutional formulations or provisionary political compromises.
Despite the express constitutional protection of freedom of religion or beliefs (and not-
withstanding the ruling in the case of Rev Stanislaus vs Madhya Pradesh, 1977 SCR (2)
611),27 contemporary debate centres on whether this freedom is signiﬁcantly restricted
in individual state and national laws. For example, in the states of Orissa, Madhya
Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh ‘anti–conver-
sion’ laws criminalise aspects of conversion from one religion to another. For example,
the Freedom of Religion Act 2006 in Himachal Pradesh says:
No person shall convert or attempt to convert, either directly or otherwise, any person from
one religion to another by the use of force or by inducement or by any other fraudulent
means nor shall any person abet any such conversion.28
This issue links to the wider question of whether freedom of religion equals freedom to
change religion, and the extent this eﬀectively reﬂects cultural contingency. The Indian
state has ratiﬁed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICCPR). Article 18 asserts that, ‘everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
of his [sic] choice… ’.29 This formulation is weaker that the original proposed wording
recognising the ‘right to change’. The latter was rejected by Muslim states, particularly
Saudi Arabia, resulting in the current, vaguer ICCPR formulation. According to a
leading proponent30 ‘there can be no doubt that the freedom to adopt a religion of
one’s own choice includes the right to withdraw one’s membership in one religious
society and join another’. This right is compatible with a state religion, ‘so long as the
State permits other religions alongside the oﬃcial one and does not exercise direct or
indirect coercion to join the latter’. According to Manfred Nowak, the phrasing of
ICCPR Article 18(2) ‘No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice’ does prohibit coercion. It
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is based on an Egyptian proposal at the UN Human Rights Council aimed at ‘protection
against legal barriers to a change of religion or those established by the religion itself’. It
also applies to indirect means of coercion, such as tax or social welfare beneﬁts, which
would ‘impair’ the exercise of the right to freedom of religion’.31 Notwithstanding such
assertions, the existence of state ‘anti-conversion’ laws in India does suggest cultural con-
tingency as to whether freedom of religion equals freedom to change religion. As Iqtidar
Karamat Cheema notes, there are fundamental incompatibilities between India’s domestic
legal code and its international obligations: ‘there are constitutional provisions and state
and national laws in India that do not comply with international standards of freedom
of religion or belief, including Article 18 of the ICCPR’.32
The foregoing social, legal and constitutional issues underline the relevance of exploring
the Indian situation, not least because of the fact that to a signiﬁcant degree, rights practice
is shaped by politics. Since the founding of the Republic, it is the rise of Hindu nationalism
that has been one of the foremost political factors shaping inter-faith relations.33 As Neera
Chandhoke explains: ‘overtaking civil society in India, this nationalism – both exclusive
and insular to a frightful degree – strongly bears the imprimatur of the state… the BJP-
led government has managed to legitimize a deep-seated intolerance in India’s civil society’.34
The result of this volatile mix is a continuing trend of religious-based violence in the
country today. Here the complexity of the link between religious freedom and communal
violence should be acknowledged. Intransigent governments may assert that violence
against members of a religious community has nothing to do with their religious identity.
In some instances this may be so; religious minorities may be caught up in what is primar-
ily a rule of law issue. Yet, as leading accounts underline, to a signiﬁcant degree, communal
violence is intimately linked to religious intolerance and persecution. The malaise is com-
pounded by the fact that, as the present analysis reveals, a weakening of rule of law insti-
tutions disproportionately aﬀects the health and well-being of religious minorities.35
As some observers note, communal violence cannot be divorced from the prevailing
political context. For example, Ravina Shamdasani notes,
the rise of Hindu nationalism… actively promotes Hindutva (the notion of Hindu superior-
ity and purity) [… this amounts to] an ongoing insidious attempt to build Hindu nationalism
and destroy the secular principles central to India and ﬁrmly enshrined in the country’s con-
stitution and legal and political structure.36
Moreover, there are worrying signs that the Indian Government is constraining the demo-
cratic role of civil society. For example, a recent account explained,
it is not surprising that the Indian state has proved notoriously coercive… the domain of civil
society is delineated by the state itself. And states simply happen to have their own notions of
what is politically permissible, what is culturally permissible and what is socially permissible.
And whereas these notions will enable some sections of civil society, they will necessarily
disable others.37
According to another account,
in contemporary India, political dynamics of collaboration and confrontation between state
and non-state actors increasingly unfold in legal-social ﬁelds… [For example,] in April 2015,
the Indian government revoked the licenses of 8,975 NGOs for violating FCRA [Foreign
Contribution Regulation Act, 1976] regulations38… The escalating state suspicion and tigh-
tening regulation of the voluntary sector in India today is part of a global trend.39
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As the foregoing suggests, these are key challenges facing today’s India. The political
sphere is exerting undue inﬂuence over the nominally secular civil sphere driven by par-
tisan religious nationalism. At a discursive level at least, the Indian government has
acknowledged these challenges. For example, in the wake of the Second Cycle UPR in
2012, it accepted Human Rights Council (HRC) recommendations on safeguarding the
role of civil society in preventing discrimination and violence against members of religious
minorities.40 Yet crucially, 2014 saw a change of administration with the election of the
NDA government. The following discussion explores the impact of this change of govern-
ment and the extent to which these commitments have been honoured. Following an
outline of the methodology, attention turns to the study ﬁndings and civil society views
on whether there has been progress – or further set-backs and ongoing rights violations.
Methodology
In methodological terms, the present analysis oﬀers a transferable discourse-based
approach to studying human rights implementation. The analytical framework linking
the contours of religious freedom (discussed earlier) to the data analysis stage was devel-
oped using an inductive analytical approach. Such an inductive approach is valued over
deductive techniques for its ability to allow the data to speak for themselves.41 Thus,
detailed, close reading revealed the key pathologies associated with religious freedom
issues in the UN Human Rights Council reportage associated with the Universal Periodic
Review. The development of the analytical frame is illustrated in Table 1 (below).
The discourse analysis subsequently applied the analytical framework of pathologies to
72 reports submitted by civil society organisations for the third cycle UPR covering the
years 2012–17 (see Appendix 1). The aforementioned number of CSO submissions
under-reports the breadth of civil society input into the UPR for many are joint sub-
missions authored by broad coalitions of standalone organisations (one, for example,
has input from 181 CSOs).42 Application of the analytical framework to the CSO data
allowed analysis of the ‘issue-salience’ or level of CSO attention to (and prioritisation
of) the diﬀerent pathologies in the corpus. During the coding process appropriate soft-
ware43 was used to divide the UPR reports into ‘quasi-sentences’ (or, ‘an argument
which is the verbal expression of one term, idea or issue’).44 Sub-dividing sentences in
this manner controlled for long sentences that contained multiple references to religious
freedom issues.45 To ensure accuracy the coding was repeated by a research assistant. In
the small minority of cases where coding diﬀered46 such instances were re-checked and a
ﬁnal coding agreed. All textual extracts were logged into a database that enabled descrip-
tive statistical analysis of issue-salience and subsequent examination of framing. Religious-
based violence and forced conversion were included in the analytical framework. The
reason for this is twofold: both issues are included in UN and UPR discourse on upholding
religious freedom and, they feature in the wider literature on religious freedom. Forced
conversion undermines religious freedom by coercion and the denial of choice.47
Whilst, religious violence is often designed to intimidate victims and undermine their
right and ability to follow their faith.48
The second component of the analysis draws on a wider literature examining the way
that human rights issues are framed.49 Framing derives from the classic work of Erving
Goﬀman.50 It refers to the language used by policy actors. Eﬀectively it is a ‘schemata
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of interpretation’51 that is concerned with the inherent meanings, sentiments, messages
and criticality in relation to social and political communication.52 As the following
reveals, framing deepens the analysis for it moves beyond the level of attention to
diﬀerent types of rights violation – or pathology53 – to consider the way that language
is expressed.54 The frames and associated tropes (or, crosscutting ‘terms, ﬁgures of
Table 1. Inductive analytical framework based on religious freedom pathologies identiﬁed in UN
reportage on India in the universal periodic review.
Pathology
Examples of reference to individual pathologies in UN UPR reports on
India
Violence ‘The country team indicated that incidents of religious minorities being
targeted during riots, particularly prior to elections, needed to be
addressed’ (HRC, 2017a, p.6, para 3, 31).
Authorities’ failure to uphold religious freedom
(including police malpractice)
Need to ‘further invest in dedicated human rights training of police
oﬃcials to register and investigate cases of discrimination and
violence and to hold them accountable when they fail to do so’ (HRC,
2017b, p.17, para 160.66).
Discrimination, (in)equality and oppression ‘The Special Rapporteur recommended that India enact legislation to
curb all forms of de facto housing discrimination against any
individual or group, especially religious or ethnic minorities’ (HRC,
2017, p.15, para 3).
Human Rights incompatibility of current laws The ‘Special Rapporteur on executions noted with concern that the
Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 had not
incorporated Dalit Muslims and Christians into the deﬁnition of
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and recommended that the
legislation be reviewed to extend the deﬁnition’ (HRC, 2017a, p.4,
para 17).
Restrictions on civil society We remain ‘worried about the social hardship endured by marginalised
groups and restrictions on civil society’ (HRC, 2017b, p.5, para 27);
‘concern about the increasing restrictions imposed on independent
civil society actors, including those belonging to religious minorities’
(HRC 2017b, p.8, para 91).
Government failure to respond to earlier UPR
recommendations
‘Ensure previous recommendations are addressed… . To Ensure that
laws are fully and consistently enforced to provide adequate
protections for members of religious minorities, scheduled castes,
tribes, and other vulnerable populations’ (HRC 2017b, p.17, para
160.72).
Forced Conversion issues ‘Guarantee freedom of religion or belief by implementing existing laws
to better protect individuals belonging to minority groups from hate
speech, incitement to religious violence, discrimination on religious
grounds and forcible conversions’ (HRC 2017b, p. 21, para 160.133).
Incitement ‘Take visible policy and other measures to ensure the freedom of
religion and belief and address the alarming trend of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance including mob
violence committed, incited and advocated by right-wing parties and
aﬃliated extremist organizations against minorities, particularly
Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Dalits’ (HRC 2017b, p. 20, para
160.130).
Note: Human Rights Council (2017a), Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Twenty-seventh session 1–12 May
2017, Compilation on India – Report of the Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, HRC, A/
HRC/WG.6/27/IND/2.
Human Rights Council (2017b), Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Twenty-seventh session 18 May 2017,
Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: India, A/HRC/WG.6/27/L.8.
Human Rights Council (2017a), ibid.
Human Rights Council (2017a), ibid.
Human Rights Council (2017b), ibid.
Human Rights Council (2017b), ibid.
Human Rights Council (2017b), ibid.
Human Rights Council (2017b), ibid.
Human Rights Council (2017b), ibid
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speech and argument that give persuasive power to larger narratives [including frames] of
which they are part’)55 were inductively generated through systematic reading of the
corpus of religious freedom extracts in the database, for example: ‘protection’, ‘rights’,
‘criminality’, ‘freedom’, ‘politics’, and ‘hatred’. The level of attention to the diﬀerent
frames in the corpus was determined by content analysis of electronic versions of the
CSOs’ UPR submissions.56
Contemporary pathologies in upholding human rights and religious
freedom
This section addresses research questions 1 and 2. Namely; to identify and explore
which human rights issues civil society organisations (CSOs) highlight in the corpus of
third cycle submissions to the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 2012–17
and; to understand the priority (or ‘issue-salience’) they attach to diﬀerent rights
violations. This reveals the pathologies highlighted in the civil society organisations’ UPR
discourse. These are summarised in Table 2. Each is discussed in one of eight sub-headings
below.
(i) Religious-based violence
Religious-based violence is the lead pathology in the CSOs’ third cycle UPR discourse
(constituting 42.1 per cent of all quasi-sentences). Whilst ‘violence among Hindus,
Muslims, and Sikhs has been a relatively regular feature of postcolonial Indian
society’,57 over recent years the contemporary interplay of politics and law has driven a
rise in violence. This ﬁnding is supported by oﬃcial data showing an increase after the
election of the NDA government in 2014. According to India’s Federal Interior Ministry,
there was a 17 per cent increase in communal violence in 2015, compared to the previous
year (751 incidents, several go unreported); 97 people were killed and 2,246 people were
injured. States with signiﬁcant instances of communal violence include Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Gujarat. Oﬃcial ﬁgures vary for
2016. According to the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs 703 communal incidents took place
across the country in which 86 persons lost their lives and 2,321 were injured;58
whereas the National Crime Records Bureau records 876 incidents of sectarian rioting
under ‘oﬀences against public tranquillity’.59
The present analysis provides situated knowledge in the form of CSOs’ description of
the problem today. For the hundreds of civil society organisations taking part in the UPR
Table 2. Issue-salience of human rights pathologies on religious freedom in the third cycle UPR
discourse of CSOs (N = 1,063).
Pathology Percentage
Violence 42.1
Authorities’ failure to uphold religious freedom (inc. police malpractice) 16.8
Discrimination, (in)equality and oppression 13.3
Human Rights incompatibility of current laws 11.0
Restrictions on civil society 4.5
Government failure to respond to earlier UPR recommendations 4.4
Forced Conversion issues 4.1
Incitement 3.8
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religious-based violence over-shadows all other religious freedom issues in India during
the period 2012–17. As Cecilia Jacob observes:
Communal violence continues to be highly politicized in India. In the lead up to the 2014
general elections the United Progressive Alliance, led by Congress,60 attempted unsuccess-
fully to re-introduce the Draft Prevention of Communal Violence (Access to Justice and
Reparations) bill to the upper house in the last parliamentary session, inﬂaming political
debate. The original bill, drafted by secular civil society actors and adapted without their
approval, was introduced into the lower house of parliament in 2011 where it was rejected.
The Hindu nationalist party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is ideologically opposed to the bill,
and their position is defended on the basis that the deﬁnition of ‘majority’ communities in
India discriminates against Hindu populations.61
According to the CSO discourse, Hindu nationalism is the principal political force driving
the inter-faith violence witnessed over past decades.62 This viewpoint is typiﬁed by the
observations of one CSO that noted:
With a regime change in India in 2014 when a more liberal and ‘secular’UPA-II [United Pro-
gressive Alliance] gave way to the “right” wing NDA-II [National Democratic Alliance] there
has been an increase in violence against Christians and Muslims, the two non-Indic religious
minorities in India… [Hindu nationalists’ view is that] ‘Hindus alone are national, and the
Muslims and others (i.e. Christians, Muslims and followers of other non-Indic religions), if
not actually anti-national, are at least outside the body of the nation. Hence the constant need
to Indianise Christians and Muslims; and violence against them is a tactic to assimilate them
into the Hindu nation.63
Others gave graphic illustrations of the problem. One alleged, ‘Catholic nuns are attacked
deliberately to teach a lesson to, shame and intimidate the Christian community in India,
and to force it to a subservient status in Indian society’.64 Another alluded to
serious problems with the treatment of Muslims in India. Signiﬁcant human rights challenges
include: extrajudicial executions committed by police and security personnel, as well as non-
State actors; arbitrary and unlawful detentions; torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment of terrorism suspects in police custody.65
A further strand of the discourse centred on what a number of CSOs saw as government
under-reporting of the problem. For example, one noted that:
according to the latest available National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) report (2015),66
there were 1,227 communal incidents in 2014 and 789 communal incidents in 2015,
which blatantly contradicts the Home Ministry statistics. Moreover, there are still a substan-
tial number of communal incidents that go unrecorded formally by any government
agency.67
Others alluded to ‘the absence of a systematic reporting requirement for deaths and
injuries in crowd control settings… largely underestimate the prevalence of deaths and
injuries’,68 and noted that for episodes of civil unrest ‘accurate estimates are currently
unavailable for the number of people killed or injured’.69 In contrast, for its part, the
Government of India’s submission to the UPR set out two retroactive policy measures
(i.e. to deal with outbreaks of violence rather than proactive violence avoidance measures).
The ﬁrst, was to enhance ‘compensation to victims of communal violence’ (from
Rs. 300,000 to Rs.500, 000). The second was the issuing of ‘Communal Harmony Guidelines
which lay down Standard Operating Procedures to deal with communal violence’.70
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Aside from physical violence the CSO discourse also highlights symbolic violence. This
aligns with the classic theorisation of Pierre Bourdieu and refers to cultural imperialism
and disrespect for individuals’ cultural capital as expressed in art, rituals, social norms
and traditions. Bourdieu explains how ‘its oppressive power is as malevolent as physical
violence…With the mechanism of symbolic violence, domination tends to take the
form of a more eﬀective, and in this sense more brutal, means of oppression’.71 Thus,
for example, one CSO referred to the fact that, in its view:
In the last three decades Muslims have been subjected to increased symbolic violence. They
have been chronically stigmatized on the basis of their way of life, the way they dress, their
appearances, their eating habits, their worship patterns, etc. Christians too experience similar
symbolic violence… The biggest symbolic violence against both Christians and Muslims is
that they are portrayed as cultural outsiders.72
According to the CSO corpus the underlying reasons for symbolic violence towards
Muslims and Christians are ‘(i) they are looked at as the products of colonialism; (ii)
they are perceived to have embraced Christianity for petty beneﬁts; and (iii) they are
said to be indulging in fraudulent proselytisation. The biggest symbolic violence against
both Christians and Muslims is that they are portrayed as cultural outsiders’.73 According
to the CSO discourse the symbolic violence operates through discourse. Notably, in pol-
itical speeches that incite and denigrate Muslim and Christian culture and practices and
articulate these as ‘un-Indian’. In a manner that variously resonates with Becker’s
classic work on labelling theory,74 Young on oppression and cultural imperialism,75 and
De Beauvoir (1949)76 on ‘othering’. This is ‘a process (…) through which identities are
set up in an unequal relationship… the simultaneous construction of the self or in-
group and the other or out-group in mutual and unequal opposition. Othering thus
sets up a superior self/in-group in contrast to an inferior other/out-group’.77 As one
CSO noted,
The highest in the government and the Sangh Parivar are in unison in sending across the
message that Islam is un-Indian and Muslims by and large anti-national. We must take
these signs seriously because the implications of linking up religion and nationalism are
bound to be disastrous.78
(ii) Authorities’ failure to uphold religious freedom (including police malpractice)
This is the second-ranked pathology in the UPR discourse (16.8 per cent of quasi-sen-
tences). A recent account explains the roots of the problem:
The currency that communal violence has in generating cohesion within political constitu-
encies, and the depth of impunity enjoyed by the judiciary and police, have made addressing
this form of political violence an enduring blight on the country’s democratic track record,
rather than an impetus for the creation of robust preventive and protection mechanisms.79
The impunity with which authorities ignore intimidation, religious violence or fail to
follow due process is further conﬁrmed by Moyukh Chatterjee’s account:
since the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India, in 2002, NGOs, activists, and survivors have
relied on India’s criminal-justice system to hold Hindu perpetrators accountable. But lower
courts… eﬀectively immunized perpetrators from prosecution. This impunity eﬀect…
allows public, even spectacular violence to go unpunished.80
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In a similar vein, another study highlighted that law enforcers sometimes, ‘interpret
human rights and what they see as traditional values in ways that support police use of
violence. At other times, they compromise on the extent to which they can protect
human rights’.81
The latter resonates with the civil society discourse. For example, one CSO observed: ‘in
March 2015, a trial court in Delhi acquitted 16 policemen accused of killing 42 Muslim
men 28 years previously arbitrarily picked up from Meerut city of Uttar Pradesh, 70
km to Delhi’s northeast. Charges were dismissed due to “scanty, unreliable and faulty
investigation”’.82 Another recalled:
Christians in Chhattisgarh especially in the Bastar area have been facing massive politically
inspired opposition, which has manifested itself in the form of physical violence and social
discrimination. The apathy, impunity and partisanship of the administration at various
levels has compounded the human tragedy, and the gravity of the violation of Constitutional
guarantees of Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Association and Movement, and most
important, the Freedom of Religion and Belief.83
Here it is important to reﬂect on CSOs’ reports of police apathy. Analysis of the UPR
corpus suggests that it extends to all kinds of oﬀences and is reﬂective of the declining
capacity of law enforcement institutions since 2014. For example, one CSO referred to
India’s judiciary also suﬀers from the lack of resources, rendering it ineﬀective… The result
of this apathy is a huge number of cases pending disposal in India. According to National
Judicial Data Grid there are 21,909,846 cases pending before District Courts across the
country as on 4 May 2016.84
However, as the following analysis indicates, it is clear that police apathy and allied failings
are worse in the case of religious freedom issues. Furthermore, it is necessary to be cogni-
sant of the federal nature of public administration in India. Whilst some CSOs refer to the
‘administration’ as if it were a monolithic entity, others present a more accurate picture.
They allude the fact that, under federalism law and order questions rest primarily with
states and that these, as well as central government, shape the way in which religious
freedom issues are dealt with. The UPR corpus reveals CSOs’ concerns with the capacity
of state level jurisprudence. For example, one alluded to the fact that, ‘more than 18 states
in India are not even spending 1% of the budget allocated to judiciary’.85 The discourse
also reveals that addressing contemporary shortcomings is not solely a matter of increas-
ing resources but also a question of the need for police reform. Thus for example, another
CSO asserted:
We recommend that the Indian government or the UN train India’s police forces to act in an
unbiased manner. They must be trained to anticipate violence stemming from religious ten-
sions, stop and prosecute attackers, and protect victims of violence… authorities should set a
standard for tolerance by giving fair treatment to all citizens regardless of religion.86
A signiﬁcant trope within this pathology is a reference to failings in judicial proceedings
on religious violence and persecution. For example:
communal violence against religious minorities in India has increased… yet many of the
individuals responsible for these acts have not been brought to justice. Although there are
court cases pending for these incidents, NGOs report religious bias and corruption and inti-
midation of witnesses in court proceedings87
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and
India should address the signiﬁcant gaps in the delivery of justice and compensation to
victims of communal violence by… ensuring that First Information Reports (FIRs) are eﬀec-
tively investigated and prosecuted [… and] providing protection to victims and witnesses
before, during and after the trial process.88
Religious intolerance is a further prominent trope in the CSO discourse. It refers to the
failure of a given faith community to accept the coexistence and religious freedom of
another faith community. Commonly, this is expressed through negative discourse and
discrimination but may extend to incitement, violence and intimidation. In the present
case it is evident in CSOs’ observations on the intolerance of some Hindus, notably in gov-
ernment circles, towards minority religions.89 For example, one CSO described how,
a culture of intolerance has taken root in India and has grown more menacing…Dissent –
whether political, religious, cultural or social – now entails greater risks. India has become a
battleground on which the deﬁnition of what is national or, indeed, anti-national is fought.90
Another added that,
the situation of freedom of belief, thought and expression [… is one of] growing intolerance:
any expression narrating a diﬀerent point of view is perceived with resentment and hostility
and there are high-pitched demands for bans and followed by physical threats, vandalism and
abusive campaigns via media.91
(iii) Discrimination, (in)equality and oppression
Religious discrimination is the third ranked pathology (13.3 per cent of quasi-sen-
tences). The importance of this issue is that it undermines of societal well-being in con-
temporary India. Furthermore, as noted, it fuels communal violence and leads to a
range of ills, including maladministration in the justice system, mistrust and social div-
ision. The malaise is revealed by the country’s international rankings. Globally, India is
ranked as 34th out of 253 countries in terms of having the highest level of state discrimi-
nation against minority religions. It is also ranked 13/253 in relation to societal discrimi-
nation against minority religions.92 These indices are at odds with the government’s UPR
discourse which asserts:
Recognizing the importance of religious freedom for the safe and secure enjoyment of human
rights and life with dignity for all, India remains committed to protecting its secular, multi-
ethnic, multi-religious, pluralistic character, and combating instances of religious intolerance,
violence and discrimination.93
In contrast the CSO discourse points to the institutional basis of religious discrimi-
nation. For example, one asserted that there is, ‘deep rooted prejudice and institutional
bias against the religious minorities in India’s law and order machinery – police, federal
investigation agencies, para-military, and army needs rigorous correction’.94 Another
explained:
India’s “personal law” code, which governs matters like marriage, divorce, and inheritance,
diﬀers depending on one’s religious community, [it…] disadvantages converts to Christian-
ity by denying them rights of inheritance and child custody that would have been theirs if
they had not converted. Similarly, low-caste converts to Christianity (and Islam) lose
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advantageous access to reservations set aside for low-caste “Hindus” (construed broadly, to
include Buddhists, Jains, etc.) in the civil service, legislative bodies, and educational
institutions’.95
Ayelet Harel-Shalev underlines the gendered-nature of this institutionalised
discrimination:
religious and cultural norms continue to be the most prevalent and widely accepted justiﬁca-
tions in India for discrimination based on sex/gender…Were the state and its judicial system
willing to listen to the voices of Indian women, particularly those of Muslim Indian women,
perhaps the outcomes of the Hindu–Muslim negotiation process would have been diﬀerent.96
Other CSOs pointed to the wider patterns of inequality. For example, one observed
there is no substantial improvement in economic and social situation of religious minorities
even a decade after the Recommendations of the Sachar Commission97 and the Rangannath
Mishra Commission.98 They still lack inclusion in employment within government insti-
tutions, civil services, police and access to basic public amenities.99
(iv) The incompatibility of current laws with international human rights obligations
This was the fourth-ranked pathology in the CSOs’ discourse (11 per cent of quasi-sen-
tences). Inconsistencies and omissions mean that, as Iqtidar Karamat Cheema explains,
‘national and state laws are used to violate the religious freedom of minority communities’.
Examples are manifold. They include articles in the Constitution (for example, Article 48
and a raft of state laws that signiﬁcantly restrict or ban cow slaughter), as well as enact-
ments on forcible conversion. Caste law provides a further example. Caste and religion
are not coterminous, as a recent account makes clear,
while many religious leaders continue to teach the continuation of the caste system and dis-
criminatory practices, and religion clearly has contributed to the perpetuation of the caste
system, the problem of caste discrimination is fundamentally a problem of society and not
of religion.100
Notwithstanding this, the current framing of the law has discriminatory eﬀects. As one
CSO complained, ‘as a result of the 1950 Order,101 Muslim and Christian Dalits are
excluded from the purview of ‘Scheduled Castes’, denied reservations in jobs and
elected bodies which are available to their Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh counterparts’.102
As another CSO put it,
The continuance of Part (iii) of Article 341 of the Constitution eﬀectively denies 200 million
of Scheduled Castes persons (Dalits) the Rights to Freedom of Faith and Belief by making it
compulsory that they remain Hindus to avail of aﬃrmative action.103
The CSO discourse also highlights how current laws are being used to stiﬂe freedom of
speech on religion. For example, one referred to Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code104
arguing that:
[It] criminalises expression “intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its
religion or religious beliefs.” The oﬀense is punishable with up to four years’ imprisonment
and/or a ﬁne. In order to ﬁnd an individual guilty, prosecutors need only prove an intention
to insult, regardless of whether another person is actually insulted… as part of an out-of-
court settlement… [a named publishing house withdrew a title from sale as part of an
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agreement with…] complainants, who argued that the book was oﬀensive to Hindus and
therefore violated Section 295A’.105
In the UPR corpus CSOs also allude to how the police are able to take advantage of legal
shortcomings. For example, one noted that
According to the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) Section 197106 and its current
interpretation and implementation, courts may not hear a case against a police oﬃcer unless
Central or State government gives authorization for prosecution… The decision to prosecute
or not to prosecute must be only lie with a judicial authority.107
(v) Government restrictions on civil society
This the ﬁfth-ranked pathology (4.5 per cent of quasi-sentences). It is particularly con-
cerning given civil society’s key role in holding the government to account. Debika
Goswami and Rajesh Tandon describe the recent shift aﬀecting the civil sphere:
Religious foundations are coming up with their own networks, associations, and NGOs to
build public opinion behind their own interests. Overall, civil society in India today has
experienced a perceptible change; earlier it approached issues from people’s perspective
and the state was seen as duty bound. The approach was to support the interests of the
people to claim their rights in relation to the state. Now a signiﬁcant section of civil
society has been co-opted by the state; they act like extended hands of the state’.108
In contrast, the government’s UPR discourse denies a post-2014 shift in the approach to
civil society. It refers to
a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic population… Supported by a rights-oriented
constitutional framework, a secular polity, and independent judiciary, a range of national and
state level commissions that monitor compliance with human rights, a free press, and a
vibrant and vocal civil society.
It vows ‘to continue involving civil society in the UPR process’ and asserts that its priority
is ‘recognizing that a vibrant civil society keeps the Government accountable for its com-
mitments, and provides crucial feedback for drafting eﬀective policy responses for advan-
cing human rights’.109
In response, the CSO discourse is often caustic in describing state restrictions. For
example, one asserted:
The middle ground for human rights work throughout India is eroding fast. Social activists,
civil society leaders and “right to information” activists are increasingly facing the wrath of
the state, despite it being the largest democracy in the world. Instead of treating these activists
as partners in a very vibrant democratic process, the state more often perceives them as
threats to “national security” and “national interests”. As a result, the state is increasingly tar-
geting, harassing, imprisoning—and sometimes even killing—many of these defenders.110
In a similar vein, another noted that:
Article 19 (c) of the Indian Constitution111 guarantees the right to form associations and
unions. Moreover, article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which India is a state party, also guarantees freedom of association. However,
despite these commitments, the government has since 2012 used restrictive legislation and
policies to target civil society organisations, suspended the operations of some and cancelled
the registration others.112
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Kamlesh Kumar’s account powerfully illuminates the deteriorating situation, ‘human
rights defenders face violence, victimization and violations of human rights not only indi-
vidual level but their families too. Both the genders [a]re victimized by state actors like
police and other civil servants’.113 It is a trend that is repeatedly highlighted in the CSO
discourse. For example, one complained:
there are signiﬁcant concerns that human rights defenders and NGOs, and foreign organis-
ations which provide them with funding, are becoming targets for state repression. This is
exacerbated by nationalist groups who are calling on the government to curb the work of
foreign NGOs in the country, claiming that foreign involvement is not conducive for
India’s development.114
Part of the repression stems from the legal requirement that all CSOs receiving external
funds are required to register and submit periodic reports of their activities to the Ministry
of Home Aﬀairs, under Section 12(4)(f) of the Foreign Contributions (Regulations) Act
(2010).115 Subsequent amendments to the Act116 have signiﬁcantly altered the licensing
requirements for CSOs in India, as well as limited their ability to receive foreign
funding, upon which many of these organisations are heavily dependent. In consequence,
since 2014 the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs has cancelled the licenses of 24,000 NGOs.117
(vi) Government failure to respond to earlier UPR recommendations
This is a reoccurring pathology highlighted in the CSO discourse (4.4 per cent of quasi-
sentences). It links to the burgeoning academic literature on human rights implementation
gaps.118 The underlying causes are diverse. As one account underlines, we can
attribute gaps between human rights principles and practices to wilful disobedience, self-
interested defection, and ineﬀective enforcement… [As well as] state capacity in particular
— [this maps onto] bureaucratic eﬃcacy; noncompliance is often inadvertent and con-
ditioned by a state’s ability to implement treaty terms.119
All of these factors resonate with the UPR discourse. For example, the HRC’s Second Cycle
UPR Recommendations of 2012 stated that India, should ‘ensure that laws are fully and
consistently enforced to provide adequate protections for members of religious minorities,
scheduled castes, and Adivasi groups, as well as, women, traﬃcking victims, and LGBT
citizens’.120 Yet, as one CSO complained, this has only been ‘partially implemented’. It
proceeded to note that, ‘while some progressive laws exist… implementation is weak’.
In another instance, the second cycle UPR recommendations called on the Government
of India to ‘continue eﬀorts to allow for a harmonious life in a multi-religious, multicul-
tural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society and to guarantee a society constituting one-
ﬁfth of the world’s population to be well fed, well housed, well cared for and well edu-
cated’.121 Again, the CSO discourse protests that this has only been ‘partially implemented’
and that ‘the State must ensure that health services are provided to all persons… irrespec-
tive of their gender identities, sexual orientation, caste and religious denominations’.122
(vii) Forced Conversion issues
This is the seventh-ranked pathology in the UPR corpus (4.1 per cent of quasi-sen-
tences). Lela Fernandes’ account explains the issue:
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the secular Indian state and the Hindu nationalist movement are invested in restricting
changes in religious membership in ways that intensify religious and caste-based inequalities.
The secular state and the Hindu nationalist movement attempt to enforce a shared model of
religion that takes the form of a ﬁxed territory.123
Moreover, as Chad Bauman observes, it is in this context that,
Christianity represents a political threat to the Hindu nationalist… conversions to Christian-
ity are seen (or portrayed) as a threat to the nation because they diminish the numbers of
those united by the common national identity, presumed to be at least vaguely Hindu in
nature.124
The problem is enshrined in the domestic code for,
individual state “Freedom of Religion” bills are active in half a dozen states. These “anti-con-
version” laws, prohibit conversion by ‘force, fraud, and inducement’. The fact that these
laws often expressly do not in any similar way manage or restrict conversion or reconversion
to Hinduism makes it plain that Christians (and, secondarily, Muslims) are their real
target.125
For those that do convert from Hinduism there are discriminatory consequences. As
Jeremy Sarkin and Mark Koenig explain, ‘famously, the Indian government decided
that low-caste Hindus who convert to other religions may no longer be legally considered
for the beneﬁts being extended to their caste groups’.126 For its part the state submission to
the UPR does not problematise the issue:
the government is duty bound to ensure that there is complete freedom of faith and that
everyone has the undeniable right to retain or adopt the religion of his or her choice
without coercion. India views anti-conversion laws as important safeguards against coercion
and inducement to convert or reconvert from one religion to another in a multi-religious
society.127
The CSO discourse oﬀers a contrary view. It is typiﬁed by the following observation:
These laws purport to outlaw “improper” conversions of Hindus to other religions, but
they fail to deﬁne clearly an “improper conversion.” The laws do not contain evidentiary
requirements and are not applied to prohibit forceful conversion to Hinduism… The auth-
orization process serves as a barrier to discourage individuals from converting from
Hinduism.128
Over recent years, and illustrating the non-discrete nature of the prevailing pathologies,
the issue of conversion has fuelled religious violence. As Satish Kolluri observes,
Hindu nationalists… in a move to prevent what they perceive as the ‘forcible conversions’ of
low-caste Hindus to Christianity and Islam have escalated violence against minority commu-
nities, especially against the Christian missionaries, who have seemed to replace the Muslims
as the (Hindu) object of hate, at least for the time being.129
The CSO discourse provides a series of examples of this. For example, one submission
complained,
soon after election results came out in May 2014, Christians were targeted in Uttar Pradesh in
incidents of Church attacks and physical violence…A Shuddhikaran (literally Puriﬁcation)
ceremony was planned for December 25, 2014 where in the RSS’s Dharma Jagran Vibhag
planned to ‘reconvert’ thousands of Christians back to Hinduism.130
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(viii) Political incitement
This is the eighth-ranked pathology (3.8 per cent of quasi-sentences). It is supported by
oﬃcial statistics that record 976 oﬀences in 2016 of ‘promoting enmity between diﬀerent
groups on the basis of religion, race and place of birth’.131 The CSO discourse shows the
principal cause to be the role of party politics in administering policy and law in this nom-
inally secular state. In turn, this points to the need for a more robust UN framework on the
issue. Yet, as Tahir Mahmood notes, ‘time and again eﬀorts have been made at the inter-
national level for the adoption of a UN instrument against defamation of religion, but
nothing has yet come out of these concerns of a sizable number of member states’.132
Nominally, at least, legal protections do exist in domestic law. Under the Indian Penal
Code, Section 153(A), it is unlawful to promote ‘enmity between diﬀerent groups on
the ground of religion’. Moreover, Section 153(B) of the Code further aﬃrms that ‘impu-
tations and assertions prejudicial to national integration are a crime.133 However, as the
CSO discourse underlines, political incitement remains a key underlining factor in con-
temporary rights abuses. For example, one observed that in its view,
the status of Religious Minorities in India [has] worsened after the last UPR in 2012 [… This]
has to be understood in the context of the present regime in power in India. One illustration
is the slew of remarks that incite mobs to violence against India’s religious minorities
(especially Muslims and Christians), made by members of the Central Council of Ministers
and Members of Parliament since May 2014.134
Another oﬀered the succinct observation that ‘the erosion of the principles of secularism
and toleration risks fanning inter-religious tensions’.135 Having identiﬁed the rights path-
ologies in the UPR discourse, attention now shifts to CSOs’ use of language and the
framing of their observations.
The framing of CSOs’ third cycle UPR discourse on religious freedom
This section addresses research question three – namely, using discourse analysis, to
examine the way that CSOs’ frame their critical views on the Indian government’s
response to its international rights obligations. Here a key ﬁnding is that civil society
organisations’ identiﬁcation of violence as the principal human rights pathology in the
UPR corpus is reﬂected in the framing of the discourse on religious freedom. The most
prominent frame used by civil society organisations is the ‘attack’ on minorities and reli-
gious freedom (Table 3). Together with associated tropes (see below), it accounts for
almost a quarter (23.9 per cent of all quasi-sentences, N = 1,695). As noted, the present
frame analysis is a ‘schemata of interpretation’136 that is concerned with the inherent
meanings, sentiments, messages and criticality in relation to social and political communi-
cation.137 It deepens the analysis for it moves beyond the level of attention to diﬀerent
types of rights violation – or pathology138 – to consider the way that language is
expressed.139 The frames and associated tropes (or, crosscutting ‘terms, ﬁgures of
speech and argument that give persuasive power to larger narratives [including frames]
of which they are part’)140 were inductively generated through systematic reading of the
corpus of religious freedom extracts in the UPR database. For example, ‘protection’,
‘rights’, ‘criminality’, ‘freedom’, ‘politics’, and ‘hatred’. The level of attention to the
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Table 3. Content analysis of the principal frames and associated tropes in the corpus of CSOs’ third cycle UPR discourse on religious freedoma.
Principal frames Associated tropes Total
Attack 6.7 terror 1.4 harassment 2.1 victimisation 1.9 threat 4 torture 1.8 killing 1.8 force 2.4 intimidation 1.8 23.9
Protection 8.3 fear 1.2 safety 1.2 prevention 3.8 – – – – – 14.5
Rights 9.9 violation 2.9 denial 1.1 – – – – – – – 13.8
Criminality 8.9 prosecution 2.9 – – – – – – – – 11.9
Freedom 8.0 – – – – – – – – – 8.0
Political 5.1 nationalism 1.4 BJP 1.2 – – – – – – – 7.7
Targeting 4.5 – – – – – – – – – 4.5
Education 3.0 – – – – – – – – – 3.0
Hatred 2.9 – – – – – – – – – 2.9
Citizenship 2.7 – – – – – – – – – 2.7
Justice 2.5 – – – – – – – – – 2.5
Implementation 2.5 – – – – – – – – – 2.5
Marginalization 2.2 – – – – – – – – – 2.2
100
aFigures are each frame/ trope’s percentage of the total number of incidences of all frames and tropes in the corpus, N = 1,695.
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diﬀerent frames in the corpus was determined by content analysis of electronic versions of
the CSOs’ UPR submissions.141
The civil society discourse framed in terms of the ‘attack’ on minorities and religious
freedom discourse is typiﬁed by the recollection of one CSO:
when attacked witnesses request the assistance of the local police, they receive minimal or no
relief. Rather than arresting the perpetrators, the police are inﬂuenced by the mob to arrest
the witnesses on fabricated charges of forced conversion, blasphemy, insulting religious
beliefs, and disturbing the peace.142
As noted, a number of reoccurring tropes were associated with the attack on religious
minorities. These give power and immediacy to the civil society accounts and underline
the troubling nature of contemporary religious intolerance:
. Terror – (e.g. ‘in Tamil Nadu one writer was terrorized to withdraw his [religious]
books. Often they (writers and artists) are not provided with adequate security and pro-
tection and on the other hand, their abusers are not restricted. Mostly such abusers get
backing, encouragement, even felicitation by the Hindutya organizations and ruling
elites’);143
. Harassment – (e.g. ‘Christians have suﬀered harassment from both the government and
civil society. Their requests for help and protection have also frequently been ignored by
authorities’);144
. Victimisation – (e.g. ‘the authorities have failed to prevent religious violence across the
country. Draft legislation aimed at preventing and punishing communal and targeted
violence, and ensuring access to justice and reparations for victims, has yet to be
passed’);145
. Threats – (e.g. ‘religious minorities, especially Muslims and Christians, are feeling
increasingly at risk. Some BJP leaders have made inﬂammatory remarks against min-
orities while militant Hindu groups, who often claim to be supporters of the BJP gov-
ernment, threatened and harassed Muslims and Christians, in some cases physically
attacking them’);146
. Torture – (e.g. ‘Police use of torture on individuals accused under MCOCA147 in
Maharashtra has been widespread… [there are many accounts] detailing the torture
to which they had been subjected to extract the confessions’);148
. Killing – (e.g. ‘in March 2015, a trial court in Delhi acquitted 16 policemen accused of
killing 42 Muslim men 28 years previously arbitrarily picked up from Meerut city of
Uttar Pradesh… charges were dismissed due to a “scanty, unreliable and faulty
investigation”’);149
. Force – (e.g. ‘now again, just before the 2015 Panchayat elections, a Hindu attacked the
Muslims, torched their homes and forced them to seek refuge at the Ballabhgarh police
station’);150
. Intimidation – (e.g. ‘Converts are often subjected to violence and intimidation,
especially those who leave the Hindu faith for Islam, Buddhism or Christianity’).151
The second most prevalent frame in the UPR submissions is ‘protection’ (14.5 per cent
of quasi-sentences). For example, in its recommendations to the HRC a CSO stated, ‘India
should provide more eﬀective protection for human rights defenders, by removing the
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legal obstacles and societal repression undermining their legitimate activities to promote
and protect human rights’.152 In addition to physical protection of those threatened by
communal violence, much of the discourse under this frame is concerned with legal pro-
tections. For example, one CSO observed that:
the Government should enact a special ‘witness protection’ law to protect the lives of wit-
nesses associated with cases of communal incidents. Across the country, a large number of
witnesses turn hostile in courts and conviction rates for communal crimes are low, and there-
fore there is a need to create legal provisions for witnesses to feel secure so that justice is not
compromised.153
Others used the trope of ‘fear’ to articulate what many saw as a deteriorating situation
caused by the prevailing political climate. For example, one CSO complained that:
The narrow notion of nationalism, which the Hindu fundamentalist organisations are pro-
pagating on the streets, is creating a wave of communal feeling among both the religious
majority group as well as the minorities. There is fear and apprehension among all minority
communities and marginalised social groups that the new government has a hidden agenda
of ending diversity and trying to establish a nation-state with a monolithic culture as the
Hindu extremist groups run campaigns with impunity… 154
The third most prominent frame centred on religious freedom ‘rights’ (13.8 per cent of all
quasi-sentences). It is typiﬁed by the following example, there needs to be greater
attention to serious problems with the treatment of Muslims in India. Signiﬁcant human
rights challenges include: extrajudicial executions committed by police and security person-
nel, as well as non-State actors; arbitrary and unlawful detentions; torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment… [and] the Indian government’s failure to adequately investigate
and eﬀectively prosecute perpetrators of these human rights violations against members of
minority groups.155
Amongst the remaining frames it is signiﬁcant that CSOs framed their UPR discourse
in terms of what they saw as the ‘political’ provenance of rights violations. It was the
sixth-ranked frame (7.7 per cent of all quasi-sentences). Thus, for example, one CSO
observed:
There has been an alarming rise in discrimination and violence against religious minorities.
Violence and discrimination against Muslims and other religious minorities has long been a
problem in India… The frequency and scope of such violence, however, has substantially
increased… since 2014, and can be attributed, at least in part, to the rise in Hindu nation-
alism connected with his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).156
In the context of the heated recent debate157 over the religious implications of The Citizen-
ship (Amendment) Act, 2015,158 a further noteworthy frame in the CSO discourse is the
loss or denial of citizenship. As one CSO succinctly stated, ‘the citizenship rights of
Muslims and Christians challenged and denied’.159
Overall, the frame-analysis shows civil society organisations’ powerful evocations of
‘attack’, ‘victimisation’, ‘fear’ and ‘terror’ in their UPR submissions. This lends credence
to Vikash Singh’s account of the impact of religious tensions on the lifeworld; notably
‘the prevalence of ‘dread’ in religious practice in contemporary India [… something
that] pervades the phenomenal environment, connects and transfers between religious
practices and everyday life in India for the marginalized masses’.160
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Conclusion
At the outset of a new BJP administration following the 2019 elections, the present analysis of
the corpus of civil society organisations’ submissions to the UPR reveals how the situation in
relation to religious freedom has changed since the election of the National Democratic Alli-
ance inMay 2014. The civil society discourse highlights pathologies aﬀecting religious freedom
and human rights practice in today’s India that are contingent on the interplay of the political
and legal spheres. The ﬁndings reveal CSOs’ concerns over the weakening of the rule of law
institutions and restrictions on civil society during the period under study. This has impacted
upon the ability of individual actors, notably human rights defenders, to protect religious
freedom. CSOs also express widespread concern over a range of rights issues. Foremost is com-
munal violence, followed by authorities’ failure to uphold religious freedom (including police
malpractice), discrimination, (in)equality and oppression and growing restrictions on civil
society. In contrast, analysis of the Indian Government’s submission to the UPR reveals the
ruling administration to be sanguine. It does not acknowledge the issues highlighted by
CSOs. Instead, it alludes to ‘a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic population that
has lived together for millennia with an ethos of respect for diversity and plurality’.161
CSOs’ discourse also highlights government failure to fully address theHumanRights Coun-
cil’s earlier concerns over faith-based violence andmultiple forms of discrimination against reli-
gious minorities and human rights defenders.162 The critical framings provide powerful
evocations of the consequences of human rights pathologies on the lifeworld, including and
the widespread prevalence of hatred and fear. The endurance of diverse rights pathologies
over successive UPR cycles further points to the inadequacy of international rights enforcement.
In turn, this suggests a pressing need for reforms in line with the Paris Principles.163
In conceptual terms, the present analysis suggests that the ‘universalism [evident in UN
treaties] appears to be in conﬂict with the particularism inherent in religion’. As a leading
account continues,
the solution does not lie in excluding religion in the discussion of common good. For religion
is part of human rights history. The challenge lies, instead, in making religion part of the civil
society and nurturing a culture of intellectual solidarity.164
However, as the foregoing discussion indicates, meeting this challenge is unlikely to be
easy. This is because of the nexus between religious freedom issues and the prevailing pol-
itical context. In particular, the deteriorating post-2014 political context in which civil
society organisations operate. Again, this is reﬂected in the UPR discourse which details
constraints on CSOs’ advocacy and mobilisation. As one put it, the government has
‘used restrictive legislation and policies to target civil society organisations, [it has] sus-
pended the operations of some and cancelled the registration of others’.165 Latterly, the
nexus between political context and religion has been further underlined by government’s
use of reservations – such as the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Amend-
ment) Bill, 2019.166 Designed to provide a 10 per cent quota to economically weaker sec-
tions of society, irrespective of their religion or caste, critics predict that it will
disproportionately beneﬁt poorer segments of upper caste Hindus.167
In conceptual terms, juxtaposition of civil society and the Indian Government’s sub-
missions to the UPR suggests performativity and legitimation168 are a feature of the
post-2014 NDA administration’s framing of human rights.169 In other words, its
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submission to the UPR appears to embrace civil society engagement and the promotion of
religious freedoms in a way that advances political legitimacy.170 Whereas, the CSO data
shows that ‘legitimation’ applies.171 This is a form of ‘institutional decoupling’, or the dis-
juncture between rhetoric and reality.172 In the face of this, with a new BJP administration,
the run-up to India’s fourth cycle UPR in 2022 can be viewed as a critical juncture; one
that requires greater alignment between contemporary rights practice and UN principles.
This needs to be secured through internal legal reform, government’s adoption of fully
participatory policy and law-making practices, boosting the capacity of legal institutions,
police reform and stronger civil society advocacy of inter-faith understanding and toler-
ance. As one CSO put it, ‘India stands at a crossroads and must be careful to reassert
its commitments to the tenets of religious toleration and secularism’.173
Notes
1. Human Rights Council, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Twenty-First Session, A/
HRC/21/2 (NY: UN, 2013), 60. https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/ﬁles/document/india/
session_13_-_may_2012/a_hrc_21_2_hrc_report.pdf (accessed March 21, 2018).
2. Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Thirteenth Session
21 May-4 June 2012, Compilation Prepared by the Oﬃce of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council res-
olution 16/21, A/HRC/WG.6/13/IND/2 (NY, UN, 2012), 8, para 29.
3. The preamble to the Constitution of India states:
we, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign
socialist secular democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens: justice, social,
economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equal-
ity of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the
dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation. https://www.india.-
gov.in/sites/upload_ﬁles/npi/ﬁles/coi_part_full.pdf (accessed March 15, 2018).
4. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion
(Princeton University Press, 2017).
5. See for example: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/religious-nationalism-and-india-s-
future-pub-78703 See also, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/india-election.
html https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-47315852 (accessed May 11, 2019).
6. Raed A. Alhargan, ‘The Impact of the UN Human Rights System and Human Rights INGOs
on the Saudi Government with Special Reference to the Spiral Model’, The International
Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 4 (2012): 598–623; Leanne Cochrane and Kathryn McNeilly,
‘The United Kingdom, the United Nations Human Rights Council and the First Cycle of the
Universal Periodic Review’, The International Journal of Human Rights 17, no. 1 (2013): 176–
92; Paul Chaney, ‘Civil Society, Human Rights and Religious Freedom in the People’s Repub-
lic of China: Analysis of CSOs’ Universal Periodic Review Discourse’, The International
Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 4 (2018): 503–24; Enzamaria Tramontana, ‘Civil Society
Participation in International Decision Making: Recent Developments and Future Perspec-
tives in the Indigenous Rights Arena’, The International Journal of Human Rights 16, no.
1 (2012): 173–92; Freek van der Vet and Laura Lyytikäinen, ‘Violence and Human Rights
in Russia: How Human Rights Defenders Develop Their Tactics in the Face of Danger,
2005–2013’, The International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 7 (2015): 34–61.
7. Compare Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Harvey Mansﬁeld and Delba Win-
throp, trans., ed.); (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1835]2000).
8. Compare, Marcel Stoetzler and Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Standpoint Theory, Situated Knowledge
and the Situated Imagination’, Feminist Theory 3, no. 3: 37–49.
22 P. CHANEY
9. Mohamad Mohan, ‘Singapore and the Universal Periodic Review: An Unprecedented
Human Rights Assessment’, Journal Of East Asia And International Law 3, no. 2 (2010):
365–74; Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking, eds., Human Rights and the Universal Per-
iodic Review : Rituals and Ritualism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Leanne
Cochrane and Kathryn McNeilly, ‘The United Kingdom, the United Nations Human Rights
Council and the First Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review’, The International Journal of
Human Rights 17, no. 1 (2013): 176–92.
10. Simin Fadaee, ‘Civil Society Organisations in India and Construction of Multiplicity of
Human Rights’, The International Journal of Human Rights 18, no. 4–5 (2014): 567–77, 574.
11. Subrata K. Mitra, ‘India’s Democracy at 70: Civil Society and Its Shadow’, Journal of Democ-
racy 28, no. 3 (2017): 106–16, 115.
12. See for example, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al., eds., Politics of Religious Freedom (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 2015).
13. András Sajó and Renáta Uitz, ‘Freedom of Religion’, in The Oxford Handbook of Compara-
tive Constitutional Law, eds. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (Oxford, Oxford University
Press), 136. Chapter 8, 135–147.
14. The term was originally developed by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs
and Anti-Semitism (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1966).
15. William H. Swatos, ed., ‘Particularism’ in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society (Alta
Mira Press, 2003), 79.
16. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion
(Princeton University Press, 2017); Rowena Robinson, ‘Virtual Warfare: The Internet as
the New Site for Global Religious Conﬂict’, Asian Journal of Social Science 32, no. 2
(2004): 198–215.
17. Ishita, Banerjee-Dube, ‘Religion, Power and Law in Twentieth Century India’, History
Compass 13, no. 12 (2012): 621–29, 621.
18. http://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php (accessed March 10, 2018).
19. Satya Narayan Sabat, ‘Human Rights in Indian Culture: A Bird’s Eye View’, The International
Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 1 (2008): 143–56, 147.
20. See http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/reservations/state/79/node/3/treaty/cerd/opt/0
(accessed March 25, 2018).
21. Ramesh Thakur, ‘India and the United Nations’, Taylor & Francis, Strategic Analysis 35, no. 6
(2011): 898–905.
22. https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/constitution-india-full-text
(accessed March 15, 2018).
23. Ronojoy Sen, Articles of Faith: Religion, Secularism, and the Indian Supreme Court (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010); Nick Robinson, ‘A Quantitative Analysis of the
Indian Supreme Court’s Workload’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 10, no. 3 (2013):
570–601.
24. For a discussion see: Madhave Godbole, ‘Is India a Secular Nation?’, Economic and Political
Weekly 51, no. 15 (9 April 2016). https://www.epw.in/node/146875/pdf (accessed August 20,
2019).
25. Yüksel Sezgin, Human Rights under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt,
and India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 77.
26. They did not retain their own laws - they did not fall under the combined systems of the
Hindu Marriage/Inheritance laws. Instead they come under the Special Marriage Act.
27. Referring to Article 25(1), the Supreme Court, held that the Article does not grant is not the
right to convert another person to one’s own religion, but to transmit or spread one’s religion
by an exposition of its tenets. See https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1308071/ (accessed February
13, 2019).
28. http://www.kandhamal.net/DownloadMat/Himachal_Pradesh_Freedom_of_Religion-Act.
pdf (accessed March 15, 2018).
29. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.
pdf (accessed March 15, 2018).
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 23
30. Manfred Nowak , UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary (2nd rev.
ed.). (Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 2005). pp. xxxix + 1277. ISBN: 3-88357-134-2
31. Manfred Nowak (2005), 416.
32. Iqtidar Karamat Cheema, Constitutional and Legal Challenges Faced by Religious Minorities
in India, (Washington: U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2017), 11.
Hanna Lerner, ‘Critical Junctures, Religion, and Personal Status Regulations in Israel and
India’, Law & Social Inquiry 39 (2014): 387–1057, 392.
33. As Ravina Shamdasani observes, ‘the rise of Hindu nationalism is largely coordinated
through a group of organisations collectively known as the sangh parivar. The BJP is the pol-
itical wing, but the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which actively promotes Hindutva
(the notion of Hindu superiority and purity), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the social
wing, and the Bajrang Dal, the militant youth wing of the VHP, coordinate an ongoing insi-
dious attempt to build Hindu nationalism and destroy the secular principles central to India
and ﬁrmly enshrined in the country’s constitution and legal and political structure’. Ravina
Shamdasani, ‘The Gujarat riots of 2002: Primordialism or Democratic Politics?’ The Inter-
national Journal of Human Rights 13, no. 4 (2009): 544–51.
34. Neera Chandhoke, ‘The ’Civil’ and the ’Political’ in Civil Society’, Democratization 8, no. 2
(2001): 1–24, 14.
35. Steven Wilkinson, Religious politics and communal violence (New Delhi, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
36. Ravina Shamdasani, ‘The Gujarat riots of 2002: Primordialism or Democratic Politics?’ The
International Journal of Human Rights 13, no. 4 (2009): 544–51.
37. Neera Chandhoke, 2001, ibid, 9.
38. Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) passed in 1976 to scrutinize NGOs receiving
foreign funds for ‘political’ activities.
39. Erica Bornstein and Aradhana Sharma, ‘The Righteous and the Rightful: The Technomoral
Politics of NGOs, Social Movements, and the State in India’, American Ethnologist 43, no. 1
(2016): 76–90, 85.
40. A/HRC/21/10, recommendation 138.79.
41. Richard E Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code
Development (Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications, 1998).
42. Partners for Law in Development (PLD).
43. UAM Corpus Tool 3.
44. Andrea Volkens, ‘Quantifying the Election Programmes: Coding Procedures & Controls’, in
Mapping Policy Preferences: Parties, Electors & Governments, ed. Ian Budge (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 96.
45. A worked example. The sentence:
the treatment of Muslims in India. Signiﬁcant human rights challenges include: extra-
judicial executions committed by police and security personnel, as well as non-State
actors; arbitrary and unlawful detentions; torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment of terrorism suspects in police custody; discriminatory laws and practices;
harassment of human rights defenders; as well as the targeting of NGOs through pro-
hibitive legislation. Additionally, this report highlights the Indian government’s failure
to adequately investigate and eﬀectively prosecute perpetrators of these human rights
violations against members of minority groups
(Advocates for Human Rights, an NGO in special consultative status, in collaboration with
the Indian American Muslim Council, Jamia Teachers Solidarity Association and The Quill
Foundation, 2016, p.17) was coded under multiple pathologies: ‘violence’, ‘restrictions on
civil society’, ‘discrimination and inequality’, ‘HR Incompatibility of current laws’ and ‘Auth-
orities’ failure to uphold religious freedom.
46. 24 instances.
47. See for e.g. Satish Kolluri, ‘Minority Existence and the Subject of (Religious) Conversion’,
Cultural Dynamics 14, no. 1 (2002): 81–95, 84; Saurabh Dube, After Conversion (New
24 P. CHANEY
Delhi: Yoda Press, 2011); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Hinduism and the Politics of Rights in India’,
in Religion and the Global Politics of Human Rights, eds. Thomas Banchoﬀ and Robert
Wuthnow (Oxford University Press, 2011).
48. Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conﬂict and Civil Society: India and Beyond, World Politics 53
(April 2001), 362–98; Vikash Singh, ‘Religious practice and the Phenomenology of Everyday
Violence in Contemporary India’, Ethnography 15, no. 4: 469–92, 469.
49. See for e.g. Niina Meriläinen and Marita Vos, ‘Framing issues in the Public Debate: The Case
of Human Rights’, Corporate Communications: An International Journal 18, no. 1 (2013):
119–34; Jutta Joachim, ‘Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and
Women’s Rights’, International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 2 (Jun., 2003): 247–74; Melissa
Labonte, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention:
Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect (London: Routledge, 2013).
50. Erving Goﬀman, Frame Analysis (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1974).
51. Erving Goﬀman (1974), ibid, 27.
52. Bernd Heine and Heiko Narrog, The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
53. The use of the term ‘pathology’ follows the classic work of Brian Hogwood and Guy
Peters’ seminal work The Pathology of Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1985) comparing the human body and the body politic using the language of medical
pathology to investigate the disorders and challenges governments experience in
making and implementing policy, including imperatives such as upholding human
rights. In metaphorical terms, it also ﬁts with the present use of corpus analysis of
CSOs’ discourse.
54. James Druckman, ‘The Implications of Framing Eﬀects for Citizen Competence’, Political
Behavior, 23, no. 3 (2001): 225–56, 225.
55. Frank Fischer and John Forester, The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 165.
56. Klaus Krippendorﬀ and Mary-Angela Bock, The Content Analysis Reader (Thousand Oaks:
Sage, 2008).
57. Bauman (2013) ibid, 633.
58. Government of India, Ministry of Home Aﬀairs, Annual Reports 2015–16 and, 2016–17,
https://mha.gov.in/annualreports (accessed March 14, 2018).
59. National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India 2016 (New Delhi: NCRB, 2016), p.12, Table
1A.4.
60. The Indian National Congress Party.
61. Cecilia Jacob, ‘The Politics of Protecting Religious Minorities: The State and Communal Vio-
lence in India’, in Civilian Protection in the Twenty-First Century: Governance and Respon-
sibility in a Fragmented World, eds. Cecilia Jacob and Alistair D.B. Cook (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 163 Chapter 8, 154–71.
62. Though, it must be noted, there is not a strong correlation between anti-Christian violence
and BJP rule. See - Chad M. Bauman and Tamara Leech, ‘Political Competition, Relative
Deprivation, and Perceived Threat: A Research Note on Anti-Christian Violence in India’,
Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no. 12 (2002): 2195–216, 2198.
63. National Council of Churches in India, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 9,
para 1.3.
64. Christian Collective, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 7.
65. Advocates for Human Rights, an NGO in special consultative status, in collaboration with the
Indian American Muslim Council, Jamia Teachers Solidarity Association and The Quill
Foundation(2016) Submission to the Third Cycle UPR, (NY: UN), p.16.
66. http://ncrb.gov.in/StatPublications/CII/CII2016/pdfs/NEWPDFs/Crime%20in%20India%
20-%202016%20Complete%20PDF%20291117.pdf (accessed March 31, 2018).
67. Civil Society Coalition for Freedom of Religion and Strengthening Pluralism in India
(CSCFRSPI), Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 2.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25
68. International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations (INCLO), Submission to the Third
Cycle UPR, (NY: UN, 2016), 15.
69. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN,
2016), 15.
70. Government of India, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex
to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: India, A/HRC/WG.6/27/IND/1 (NY: UN, 2016),
paras 61 and 61.
71. Terry Eagleton and Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Doxa and Common Life’, New Left Review 191 (1992):
111–21, 115. See also Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press, 1992).
72. CSCFRSPI, 2016, ibid, p6.
73. Ibid.
74. H. Becker, Outsiders (New York: Free Press, (1973) [1963]).
75. Iris Young, Inclusion and democracy (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
76. S. de Beauvoir, Le deuxìeme sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1949).
77. M. Crang, Cultural Geography (London: Routledge, 1998).
78. Evangelical Fellowship of India, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 6.
79. Cecilia Jacob, 2016, ibid, 164.
80. Moyukh Chatterjee, ‘The Impunity Eﬀect: Majoritarian Rule, Everyday Legality, and State
Formation in India’, American Ethnologist 44, no. 1 (2017): 118–30, 211.
81. Rachel Wahl, ‘Policing, Values, and Violence: Human Rights Education with Law Enforcers
in India’, Journal of Human Rights Practice 5, no. 2 (2013): 220–42, 220.
82. Advocates for Human Rights et al, 2016, ibid, 9.
83. Evangelical Fellowship of India, New Delhi and Others (2016) Submission to the Third Cycle
UPR, (NY: UN) p.8
84. Joint Submission 11, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 7, para 2.9.
85. Ibid.
86. Jubilee Campaign, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 7.
87. Advocates for Human Rights, an NGO in special consultative status, in collaboration with the
Indian American Muslim Council, Jamia Teachers Solidarity Association and the The Quill
Foundation, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 5, para 19.
88. Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 11.
89. Kikue Hamayotsu, ‘The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and
Religious Intolerance’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 43, no. 4 (2013): 658–77.
90. PEN International, PEN Canada, and the International Human Rights Program at the Uni-
versity of Toronto Faculty of Law (IHRP), Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN,
2016), 4.
91. National Solidarity Forum, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 2.
92. The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) http://www.thearda.com/
internationalData/countries/Country_108_1.asp (accessed February 14, 2019).
93. Government of India, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the
Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: India, A/HRC/WG.6/27/IND/1 (NY:
UN, 2016), para 59.
94. Centre for Justice & Peace (CJP), India, and Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC), Sub-
mission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 8.
95. Chad M. Bauman and James Ponniah, 2017, ibid, 69.
96. Ayelet Harel-Shalev, ‘Gendering Ethnic Conﬂicts: Minority Women in Divided Societies –
The Case of Muslim Women in India’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 40, no.12 (2017): 2115–
34, 2125.
97. See Government of India, PrimeMinister’s High Level Committee Cabinet Secretariat, Social,
Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India: A Report (Delhi: GoI,
2006). http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_ﬁles/mhrd/ﬁles/sachar_comm.pdf (accessed March
25, 2018).
26 P. CHANEY
98. Government of India, Ministry of Minority Aﬀairs, Report of the National Commission for
Religious and Linguistic Minorities [Ranganath Misra Commission Report], http://www.
minorityaﬀairs.gov.in/reports/national-commission-religious-and-linguistic-minoritie
(Delhi: GoI, 2007) (accessed March 25, 2018).
99. National Solidarity Forum, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 12, para 2.17.
100. Jeremy Sarkin and Mark Koenig, 2010, ibid, 124.
101. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/99649/119024/F1418240846/
IND99649.pdf (last accessed March 18, 2018).
102. Christian Collective, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 7.
103. Centre for Justice & Peace (CJP), India, and Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC), Sub-
mission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 9.
104. http://www.indialawoﬃces.com/legal-articles/section-295a-aalysis (accessed March 25, 2018).
105. PEN International, PEN Canada, and the International Human Rights Program at the Uni-
versity of Toronto Faculty of Law (IHRP), Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN,
(2016)), 2.
106. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12704/ (accessed March 24, 2018).
107. South Asia Human Right Documentation Centre, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY:
UN, 2016), 2.
108. Debika Goswami and Rajesh Tandon, ‘Civil Society in Changing India: Emerging Roles,
Relationships, and Strategies’, Development in Practice 23, no. 5–6 (2013): 653–64, 655.
109. Government of India, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the
Annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: India, A/HRC/WG.6/27/IND/1 (NY:
UN, 2016), paras 152–154.
110. Evangelical Fellowship of India (EFI), Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 10.
111. See http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend97.pdf (accessed March 25, 2018).
112. National Solidarity Forum, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 14, para 2.6
113. Kamlesh Kumar ‘Defending the Defenders: An Analysis of Violence against Human Rights
Defenders in India’, International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 3, no.12 (2011):
460–8, 467.
114. Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), para 26.
115. http://mha1.nic.in/pdfs/FC-RegulationAct-2010-C.pdf (accessed March 18, 2018).
116. Foreign Contribution Regulation Rules 2011 https://fcraonline.nic.in/home/PDF_Doc/FC-
rules2011.pdf, Foreign Contribution (Acceptance or Retention of Gifts or Presentations)
Rules 2012 https://fcraonline.nic.in/home/PDF_Doc/doc%20main%203.pdf FCRA Amend-
ment Rules, 2015 https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dfe6a773-e8b6-4330-
a94a-9002a3bd87a7 (accessed February 14, 2019).
117. https://frontera.net/news/asia/fcra-compliance-in-india-how-24000-ngos-lost-their-license/
(accessed February 14, 2019).
118. For example, Gréta Gunnarsdóttir, ‘Domestic Implementation of International Human
Rights Commitments’, Nordic Journal of International Law 61, no. 1–4 (2014): 181–7;
Ryan Welch, ‘National Human Rights Institutions: Domestic Implementation of Inter-
national Human Rights Law’, Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 1 (2017): 96–116.
119. Wade Cole, ‘Mind the Gap: State Capacity and the Implementation of Human Rights Trea-
ties’, International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 405–41.
120. HRC, Follow up to second UPR of India (13th UPR session): The Indian Government’s
experience and continuing challenges in addressing caste based discrimination (NY:
UN, 2012) A/HRC/21/NGO/67 http://imadr.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/
Written-Statement_HRC-21st-session_Follow-up-to-UPR-India-2012.pdf (accessed March
18, 2018).
121. HRC, 2012, ibid, Recommendation (86.18)
122. Creating Resources for Empowerment and Action (CREA) and the Sexual Rights Initiative,
Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 9.
123. Leela Fernandes, ‘Unsettled Territories: State, Civil Society, and the Politics of Religious Con-
version in India’, Politics and Religion 4, no. 1 (2011): 108–35, p.111.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 27
124. Chad M. Bauman, ‘Hindu-Christian Conﬂict in India: Globalization, Conversion, and the
Coterminal Castes and Tribes’, Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 3 (2013): 633–53, 648.
125. Chad M. Bauman and James Ponniah, ‘Christian Responses to Discrimination and Violence
in India and Sri Lanka: Avoidance, Advocacy, and Interfaith Engagement’, The Review of
Faith & International Aﬀairs 15, no. 1 (2017): 68–78, 71.
126. Jeremy Sarkin and Mark Koenig, ‘Ending Caste Discrimination in India: Human Rights and
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Individuals and Groups from Discrimination at the Dom-
estic and International Levels’, The George Washington International Law Review 41, no. 3
(2010): 101–36, 121. Although reservations under the minority religions quotas should be
noted.
127. Government of India, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the
Annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: India, A/HRC/WG.6/27/IND/1 (NY:
UN, 2016) para 59.
128. Advocates for Human Rights, an NGO in special consultative status, in collaboration with the
Indian American Muslim Council, Jamia Teachers Solidarity Association and the The Quill
Foundation, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 6, para 24.
129. Satish Kolluri, ‘Minority Existence and the Subject of (Religious) Conversion’, Cultural
Dynamics 14, no. 1 (2002): 81–95, 84.
130. Evangelical Fellowship of India (EFI), Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 6,
para 7.
131. National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India 2016 (New Delhi: NCRB, 2016), 13, Table
1A.4.
132. Tahir Mahmood, ‘The US Concern for Religious Freedom: An Indian Perspective’, The
Review of Faith & International Aﬀairs 11, no. 1: 82–3, 82.
133. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/345634/ (accessed March 17, 2018).
134. Centre for Justice & Peace (CJP), India, and Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC), Sub-
mission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 5.
135. South Asia Human Right Documentation Centre, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY:
UN, 2016), 7
136. Erving Goﬀman (1974), ibid, 27.
137. Bernd Heine and Heiko Narrog, The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
138. The use of the term ‘pathology’ follows the classic work of Brian Hogwood and Guy Peters’,
seminal work The Pathology of Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) com-
paring the human body and the body politic using the language of medical pathology to
investigate the disorders and challenges governments experience in making and implement-
ing policy, including imperatives such as upholding human rights. In metaphorical terms, it
also ﬁts with the present use of corpus analysis of CSOs’ discourse.
139. James Druckman, ‘The Implications of Framing Eﬀects for Citizen Competence’, Political
Behavior 23, no. 3 (2001): 225–56, 225.
140. Frank Fischer and John Forester, The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 165.
141. Klaus Krippendorﬀ and Mary-Angela Bock, The Content Analysis Reader (Thousand Oaks:
Sage, 2008).
142. The European Association of Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses, Submission to the Third Cycle
UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 17.
143. National Solidarity Forum, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 10.
144. Civil Society Coalition for Freedom of Religion and Strengthening Pluralism in India, Sub-
mission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 10.
145. Amnesty International India, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 8.
146. Human Rights Watch, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 4.
147. Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 http://www.lawzonline.com/bareacts/
maharashtra-control-of-organised-crime-act/maharashtra-control-of-organised-crime-act.
html (accessed March 24, 2018).
28 P. CHANEY
148. Advocates for Human Rights et al, ibid, 2016, p. 5.
149. Advocates for Human Rights et al, ibid, 2016, p. 3.
150. National Council of Churches India, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 11.
151. Zo Indigenous Forum, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 15.
152. Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 8.
153. CSCFRSPI, ibid, 2016, p.7.
154. CSCFRSPI, ibid, 2016, p.14.
155. Advocates for Human Rights, et al, ibid, 2016, p. 19.
156. Advocates for Human Rights, et al, 2016, p. 8.
157. Inter alia, debate centred on the fact that the Bill amends earlier legislation to exclude “min-
ority-religious individuals” – speciﬁcally Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis and Christians – from
“Muslim-dominated countries” – speciﬁcally Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan – from
the ambit of being an “illegal immigrant”. The Bill further reduces the requirement of 11
years to acquire “citizenship by naturalisation” to only six years of ordinary residence for
such immigrants. As once source put it, ‘In simpler terms, this means that a Hindu from Paki-
stan can cross the border illegally and simply claim Indian citizenship after six years’ https://
thewire.in/67272/citizenship-amendment-bill-2016/ See also, https://www.indiatoday.in/pti-
feed/story/joint-par-panel-discusses-citizenship-amendment-bill-715661-2016-10-13
(accessed March 24, 2018).
158. https://indiancitizenshiponline.nic.in/UserGuide/E-gazette.pdf (accessed March 24, 2018).
159. Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society & Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons,
Submission to the Third Cycle UPR (NY: UN, 2016), 11.
160. Vikash Singh, ‘Religious Practice and the Phenomenology of Everyday Violence in Contem-
porary India’, Ethnography 15, no. 4: 469–92, 469.
161. Government of India, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the
Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: India, A/HRC/WG.6/27/IND/1 (NY:
UN, 2016) paras 59.
162. Human Rights Council, ibid, 2012 and 2013.
163. To which India is an ‘A’ category party. See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/
Pages/StatusOfNationalInstitutions.aspx (accessed March 24, 2018).
164. Man Yee Karen Lee, ‘Religion, Human Rights and the Role of Culture’, The International
Journal of Human Rights 15, no. 6 (2010): 887–904, 882 emphasis added
165. PEN International et al, ibid, p.17.
166. http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/PassedLokSabha/3C_%202019_LS_Eng.pdf
(accessed May 11, 2019).
167. See for example: https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/in-depth-who-is-
eligible-for-the-new-reservation-quota-for-general-category/story/308062.html (last
accessed May 11, 2019).
168. This resonates with recent analysis elsewhere – see P. Chaney, ‘Civil Society, Human Rights
and Religious Freedom in the People’s Republic of China: Analysis of CSOs’ Universal Per-
iodic Review Discourse’, International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 4 (2017): 503–24.
169. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick, Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader (London: Routle-
dge, 1999).
170. John Rawls, ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus’, in Debates in Contem-
porary Political Philosophy, eds. D. Matravers and J. Pike (London: Routledge, 2003), 79, 67–93.
171. In other words, ‘communicative actions aimed at managing the public’s perception that gov-
ernment actions are eﬀective in promoting their desired ends, whether that is in fact true’ -
Louella Moore, ‘Legitimation Issues in the State-Non-proﬁt Relationship’, Non-Proﬁt and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 30 (2001): 707–19. (p.712). https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/237766326_Legitimation_Issues_in_the_State-Nonproﬁt_Relationship
172. J. Meyer and B. Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organisations: Formal Structure as Myth and Cer-
emony’, in The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis, eds. W. Powell and
P. DiMaggio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
173. South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, ibid, 2016, 7.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 29
Acknowledgements
The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the constructive comments received through the
blind peer-review process.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was supported by the Academy of Medical Sciences Global Challenges Research
Fund Networking Grant Scheme [Award No. GCRFNG100259], and funding under Econ-
omic and Social Research Council [Awards Nos. ES/L009099/1 & ES/S012435/1].
Notes on contributor
Paul Chaney is Professor of Politics and Policy at Cardiﬀ University. He is Co-Director of Wales
Institute of Social, Economic Research and Data (WISERD). He has authored and edited 14 books
and written over 60 papers in international peer-reviewed journals. His research and teaching inter-
ests include: territorial politics, public policy-making, civil society and equality and human rights.
ORCID
Paul Chaney http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2110-0436
Appendix 1. List of CSO submissions to the third cycle UPR
Access Now; ADF International; AI – Amnesty International; Association of Parents of Disap-
peared Persons; Centre for Child and the Law; National Law School of India University; Christian
Solidarity Worldwide; Creating Resources for Empowerment in Action; Cultural Survival;
EAJCW – European Association of Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses; Four Freedoms Forum;
HRW – Human Rights Watch; ICJ – International Commission of Jurists; Indigenous 1893; Inter-
net Democracy Project; JS01 – Joint Statement by Banglar Manabadhikar Suraksha Mancha
(MASUM) (– an alliance of over 20 civil society organisations); JS02 – Joint Statement by
United NGOs Mission-Manipur (UNMM) (an alliance comprising the Council for Anti-Poverty
Action and Rural Volunteer (CAPARV), Centre for Social Development (CSD), Village Develop-
ment Organisation (VDO), Social Upliftment & Rural Education. (SURE), Abundant Life Ministry
(ALM), Rural Service Agency (RUSA), Development of Human Potential (DHP), Action for
Welfare and Awakening Rural Environment (AWARE), Rural Education and Action for Change
Manipur (REACH-M), United Tribal Development Project (UTDP), Christian Social Development
Organisation (CSDO), Chandel Khubol Social Welfare Arts and Culture Assn. (CKSWACA), Good
Samaritan Foundation (GSF), Evangelical Assembly Churches (EAC), Joint Action for Relief and
Development Association (JARDA), Rural Aid Services (RAS), Integrated Rural Development
Agency (IRDA), Socio Economic Development Organisation (SEDO), Centre for Community,
Centre for Rural Development and Educational Organisation (CERDEO), Paomei Development
Society Tungjoy (PDST), Zougam Institute for Community & Rural Development (ZICORD),
Rural Development Association (RDA), Socio Economic & Environment Development Organis-
ation (SEEDO), Integrated Rural Development Welfare Association (IRDWA), and Tangkhul
Theological Association (TTA)); JS03 – Joint Statement by a coalition of Internet Rights,
Freedom of Expression (FOE), Online and Freedom of Association and Assembly (FOAA),
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Online in India by Digital Empowerment Foundation, Internet Democracy Project, Point of View,
Nazdeek and Association for Progressive Communications (APC); JS04 – Joint Statement by the
Civil Society Coalition for Freedom of Religion & Strengthening Pluralism in India (CSCFRSPI)
is a coalition of churches, ecumenical organisations, religious bodies, and civil society organisations
who are concerned with the Freedom of Religion and minorities in India; JS05 – Joint Statement by
Women Enabled International (WEI) and Women with Disabilities India Network; JS06 – Joint
Statement by Police Reforms Watch, Jharkhand Women’s Network, Socio Legal Information
Centre, People’s Vigilance Committee on Human Rights, All India Secular Forum, White Lotus
Charitable Trust, Citizens for Justice and Peace, People’s Action For Rural Awakening, Centre
for Human Rights and Development, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Towards Advocacy
Network Developmental Action, National Alliance Group for Denotiﬁed and Nomadic Tribes,
People’s Watch, South India Cell for Human Rights Education And Monitoring, Helpage India,
National Dalit Movement for Justice, and Human Rights Alert; JS07 – Joint Statement by Zo Indi-
genous Forum (ZIF), Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), Karbi Human Rights
Watch (KHRW), Meghalaya Peoples Human Rights Council (MPHRC), Indigenous Women’s
Forum of Northeast India (IWFNEI), Zomi Human Rights Foundation (ZHRF); JS08 – Joint State-
ment by The International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination (ICAAD), Nazdeek, and
PAJHRA; JS09 – Joint Statement by National Network of Sex Workers (NNSW), India, Veshya
Anyaya Mukti Parishad (VAMP), Karnataka Sex Workers Union, (KSWU), Uttara Karnataka
Mahila Okkuta, (UKMO), Me and My World, Vadamalar Federation, Kerala Network of Sex
Workers (KNSW), SANGRAM, Women’s Initiatives (WINS), South India AIDS Action Project
(SIAAP), Tamil Nadu, Centre for Advocacy on Stigma and Marginalisation, and the Srijan Foun-
dation; JS10 – Joint Statement by National Alliance for Maternal Health and Human Rights, India;
JS11 – Joint Statement by the Asian Legal Resource Centre & Nervazhi; JS12 – Joint Statement by
the Asian Centre for Human Rights; JS13 – Joint Statement by the NewWind Association, Emmaus
Aurinkotehdas ry, and Global Human Rights Communications; JS14 – Joint Statement by Citizens
For Justice And Peace Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative FIAN India HAQ: Centre For
Child Rights, Housing and Land Rights Network Human Rights Alert India Alliance for Child
Rights Lawyers Collective Multiple, Action Research Group National Campaign On Dalit
Human Rights, Partners For Law In Development, and People’s Watch; JS15 – Joint Statement
by Evangelical Fellowship of India; JS16 – Joint Statement by Housing and Land Rights Network
India (HLRN); JS17 – Joint Statement by HAQ: Centre for Child Rights, New Delhi, Ankuram, Hol-
istic approach for People’s Empowerment (HOPE), Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN),
Jabala Action Research Group, Leher, New Delhi, Mines, Minerals & People (MM&P) – A
network of 100 grassroots groups, Samata – Assertion for People, and Nine is Mine Campaign,
VIDIYAL; JS18 – Joint Statement by Creating Resources for Empowerment and Action (CREA)
and Sexual Rights Initiative; JS19 – Joint Statement by the National Campaign on Dalit Human
Rights (NCDHR); JS20 – Joint Statement by Human Rights Education India, Asian Development
Research Institute (ADRI), Holistic approach for People’s Empowerment (HOPE), Institute of
Human Rights Education & Protection, Institute of Human Rights Education, People’s Action
for Rural Awakening (PARA), RIGHTS, SAMEEKSHA, and South India Cell for Human Rights
Education and Monitoring (SICHREM). JS21 – Joint Statement by Centre for Health Law,
Ethics and Technology Jindal Global Law School, and the India HIV/AIDS Alliance; JS22 – Joint
Statement by Partners for Law in Development (PLD); JS23 – Joint Statement by the Centre on
the Death Penalty, National Law University, Delhi, India; JS24 – Joint Statement by the Centre
for Justice & Peace (CJP), India, and Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC); JS25 – Joint State-
ment by the Civil Society Coalition on Human Rights in Manipur and the UN, Centre for Organ-
isation Research & Education (CORE), Centre for Research and Advocacy Manipur (CRAM),
Citizens Concern for Dams and Development (CCDD), Civil Liberties and Human Rights Organ-
isation (CLAHRO), Civil Liberties Protection Forum (CLPF), Committee on Human Rights,
Manipur (COHR), Extra-judicial Execution Victim Families’ Association Manipur (EEVFAM),
Families of the Involuntarily Disappeared’s Association Manipur (FIDAM), Human Rights Alert
(HRA), Human Rights Initiative (HRI), Human Rights Law Network Manipur (HRLN-M), Indi-
genous Perspective (IP), Just Peace Foundation (JPF), Movement for Peoples’ Right to Information
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Manipur (M-PRIM), Threatened Indigenous Peoples Society (TIPS) and, United Peoples Front
(UPF); JS26 – Joint Statement by Centre for Health, Education, Training and Nutrition Awareness,
and Family Planning Association of India; JS27 – Joint Statement by the Advocates for Human
Rights, an NGO in special consultative status, in collaboration with the Indian American
Muslim Council, Jamia Teachers Solidarity Association, and The Quill Foundation; JS28 – Joint
Statement by Evangelical Fellowship of India (EFI) – World Evangelical Alliance, Nagel Institute
for the Study of World Christianity, Indian Social Institute – Bangalore, Biblica – The International
Bible Society, India, Missions Association, United Christian Forum, Oxford Center for Religion and
Public Life – South Asia, Alliance Defending Freedom in India, Theological Research and Com-
munications Institute, and Indian American Muslim Council, Center for Policy Research; JS29 –
Joint Statement by Karbi Human Rights Watch (KHRW), Meghalaya Peoples Movement for
Human, Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), Karbi Human Rights Watch
(KHRW), Zo Indigenous Forum (ZIF), and Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP); JS30 – Joint
Statement by Anti-Slavery International, Jan Jagriti Jendra, The National Domestic Workers’
Movement, and Volunteers for Social Justice; JS31 – Joint Statement by PEN International, PEN
Canada, and the International Human Rights Program at the University of Toronto Faculty of
Law (IHRP); JS32 – Joint Statement by National Solidarity Forum (a coalition of organisations
and individuals) and others on the situation of Freedom of Belief, Thought and Expression;
JS33 – Joint Statement by ActionAid India, NGO partner organisations, Knowledge Hubs and
Policy Unit; JS34 – Joint Statement by National Coalition for Abolition of Bonded Labour
(NCABL) – a platform of 22 organisations (involving human rights organisations, CSOs, individual
activists, media personnel and associations of bonded labourers); JS35 – Joint Statement by the
Centre for Internet and Society India and Privacy International; JS36 – Joint Statement by the
Center for Reproductive Rights; JS37 – Joint Statement by Edmund Rice International, Franciscans
International, and NINEISMINE; JS38 – Joint Statement by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen
Participation, NGO in General, Human Rights Defenders Alert – India, Civil Society Forum on
Human Rights, Police Reforms Watch, Jharkhand Women’s Network, Socio Legal Information
Centre, Human Rights Alert, All India Secular Forum, White Lotus Charitable Trust, Citizens
for Justice and Peace, People’s Action For Rural Awakening, Centre for Human Rights and Devel-
opment, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Towards Advocacy Network Developmental
Action, National Alliance Group for Denotiﬁed and Nomadic Tribe, Helpage India – Delhi,
National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, People’s Watch, South India Cell For Human
Rights Education And Monitoring, Voice of Patient and Centre for Human Rights Studies, and
O. P. Jindal Global University; JS39 – Joint Statement by National Coalition for Education,
India; JS40 – Joint Statement by IIMA – Istituto Internazionale Maria Ausiliatrice, and VIDES
International – International Volunteerism Organization for Women, Education and Develop-
ment; JS41 – Joint Statement by Tamil Nadu Civil Society Coalition; JS42 – Joint Statement by
SuMa-Rajasthan White Ribbon Alliance for Safe Motherhood and SuMa Secretariat: CHETNA;
JS43 – Joint Statement by National NGO Child Rights Coalition (NNCRC); JS44 – Joint Statement
by Global Human Rights Communications (GHRC); JS45 – Joint Statement by Jammu Kashmir
Coalition of Civil Society & Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons; JS46 – Joint Statement
by Adivasi Women’s Network (AWN), Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP), Borok Peoples
Human Rights Organization (BPHRO), Centre for Research and Advocacy (CRA); Chhattisgarh
Tribal Peoples Forum (CTPF), Indigenous Peoples Forum, Odisha (IPFO), Jharkhand Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples for Action (JITPA), Karbi Human Rights Watch (KHRW), Meghalaya Peoples
Human Rights Council (MPHRC), Naga Peoples Movement For Human Rights (NPMHR), and Zo
Indigenous Forum (ZIF); JUBILEE CAMPAIGN; Kashmir Institute of International Relations;
Kashmir Scholars Action Group; Lawyers Collective; Oceania Human Rights Hawaii; Physicians
for Human Rights; Programme Against Custodial Torture & Impunity; PVCHR – Peoples’ Vigi-
lance Committee on Human Rights; SAHRDC – South Asia Human Rights Documentation
Centre; The Child Rights International Network; The Good Group; Zo Indigenous Forum.
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